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I. Introduction  
Traditional fishing rights have long been recognised in customary international law but 
the advent of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) seemed to cast doubt on their 
continuing importance at a general level.1 Nevertheless, a number of recent arbitral 
decisions – including the Chagos Award and South China Sea Award – appear to have 
created the conditions which foster the juridical connections between traditional(or 
artisanal) fishing rights and the Convention.2 This chapter explores the evolving 
jurisprudence concerning these non-exclusive fishing rights. In particular, it scrutinizes 
their origins in the doctrine of vested rights before examining the consequences on the 
plane of international law. It goes on to assess the manner in which the LOSC 
regulates artisanal fishing rights and the limits of its framework as far as the protection 
of these communal entitlements are concerned. It concludes by considering the role 
that other bodies of law may perform in safeguarding marine resource entitlements for 
the benefit of artisanal fishing communities and coastal-based Indigenous peoples 
alike. 
Artisanal fishing communities are, typically, distinguishable from Indigenous 
peoples but they can, and do, overlap in concrete settings.3 Moreover, artisanal fishing 
communities and Indigenous peoples often experience similar problems, including in 
relation to the issues of how sub-State groups can secure recognition of their 
                                                 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 
16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396. The LOSC does provide for the continuity of traditional fishing 
rights in the waters of archipelagic States: see Arts 47 and 51. 
2 Chagos Marine Protected Area Award (Mauritius/UK), Annex VII LOSC Tribunal, PCA (18 March 
2015); and South China Sea (Merits) Award (Philippines/People’s Republic of China), Annex VII 
LOSC Tribunal, PCA (12 July 2016). 
3 Eg the Chagos Islanders qualify as both an Indigenous people and a community of artisanal fishers. 
See the Divisional Court’s judgment in R (Bancoult No.3) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWHC 1502 (Admin); Stephen Allen, The Chagos Islanders and 
International Law (Hart 2014); and Amy Schwebel, ‘International Law and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: 
What Next for the Chagossians’, in Stephen Allen and Chris Monaghan (eds), Fifty Years of the 
British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal Perspectives (Springer 2018). 
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traditional rights in marine settings; and how such entitlements can be maintained 
given the strong tendency of State legal systems to restrict the extent to which 
historical harvesting methods can be altered and/or changes in the nature and scale 
of harvesting activities (i.e. commercialization) can be made without losing their 
‘traditional’ character. As a number of contributions to this book show, these matters 
generate fundamental questions about how the international legal system (and 
national legal systems) recognise and accommodate ancient, distinct normative 
orders. Against this background, there is scope for both sets of rights-holders to make 
a common cause as sub-State groups in key respects. Nevertheless, some scholars 
have drawn a conceptual divide between artisanal fishing rights and Indigenous 
marine resource rights by pointing out that, although artisanal rights can be pressed 
into action at the inter-State level, indigenous entitlements are exercisable against 
their ‘own’ State.4 Such a binary divide is clearly questionable in principle because 
categorizing Indigenous claim-rights as, essentially, domestic in application has the 
effect of reinforcing the statist character of the international legal order.  
To be sure, Indigenous peoples may be more focused on the job of ensuring 
that those States which have enveloped them give effect to their marine rights than on 
advancing claims against neighbouring States. Even so, in certain situations, 
Indigenous peoples are capable of asserting such entitlements against another coastal 
State as well. Of course, a State may take up the claim of one or more of its nationals 
at the inter-State level via the mechanism of diplomatic protection.5 However, this 
approach has been initiated only rarely in connection with the protection of the rights 
of Indigenous peoples in marine areas.6 Further, this chapter considers whether the 
exercise of diplomatic protection – which gives rise to State rights in keeping with the 
‘Mavrommatis fiction’7 – is necessarily the best way forward in such situations given 
that it raises wider questions about the normative character of the rights of Indigenous 
                                                 
4 See, eg, Polite Dyspriani, Traditional Fishing Rights: Analysis of State Practice (UN 2011) and 
Endalew Enyew, ‘The South China Sea Award and the Treatment of Traditional Fishing Rights within 
the Territorial Sea’ (10 August 2016) Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea: http://site.uit.no/jclos/. 
5 See section III(C) below. 
6 This was demonstrated, in the Indigenous context, by the conclusion of the 1984 Torres Strait Treaty 
between Australia and the Papua New Guinea. See SB Kaye, ‘Jurisdictional Patchwork: Law of the 
Sea and Native Title Issues in the Torres Strait’ (2001) 2 Melbourne Journal of International Law 381. 
Also see the Behring Sea Arbitration Award (Great Britain/USA) 15 August 1893, 179 CTS No 8, 
97,103, [8]. 
7 See section III(C) below. 
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peoples (and those belonging to other sub-State societal groups) within the 
international legal order.  
II. The Character of Traditional/Artisanal Fishing Rights  
Traditional fishing rights have been acknowledged to exist in situations where States 
have been engaged in processes of maritime delimitation. In such cases, the exercise 
of non-exclusive fishing rights which have long persisted in a given maritime area have 
been interpreted as a legitimate – but exceptional – factor in determining the position 
of maritime boundaries.8 Such rights may also be recognized when an area, which 
was formerly part of the High Seas, has been enclosed as a result of the introduction 
of new maritime zones by a coastal State.9 Nevertheless, there has been a marked 
shift in the perceived character of these traditional fishing entitlements in recent years. 
Specifically, during the last two decades, greater importance seems to have been 
attached to the type of the fishing being undertaken for the purpose of qualifying as 
‘traditional fishing’ rather than simply determining the duration of the fishing activity in 
question. Advocates of Indigenous rights are familiar with debates about what is meant 
by the adjective ‘traditional’. Does it connote a practice that has survived across the 
generations, perhaps since time immemorial, (i.e. is it a temporal signifier)? Does it 
require participants to use historical methods when carrying out a given activity? Or 
does the practice amount to a culturally symbolic performance which is intimately 
bound up with communal identity and livelihood rather than one which is undertaken, 
principally, for commercial purposes? 
In the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, the ICJ decided that Iceland’s newly 
extended Exclusive Fishing Zone had to accommodate the traditional fishing rights of 
the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany – on the grounds that their 
                                                 
8 An ICJ Chamber observed that traditional fishing activities could only amount to a relevant 
circumstance for the purpose of maritime delimitation if the standard methodology would produce a 
‘radically inequitable’ result, i.e. one that is ‘likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood 
and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned’: Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/USA), (1984) ICJ Reps 329 [237]. Also see the Jan 
Mayen Case (Denmark/Norway), (1993) ICJ Reps 38. The exceptional nature of moving a boundary 
on the basis of traditional fishing activities was reiterated in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundary 
Award (Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago), Annex VII LOSC Tribunal, PCA (11 April 2006) [266-269].  
9 The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (UK/Iceland) and (Federal Republic of Germany/Iceland), (1974) 
ICJ Reps 3 and 175. More recently, this issue has become significant in situations where a coastal 
State declares new maritime zones pursuant to the LOSC’s introduction. See W Michael Reisman 
and Mahnoush Arsanjani, ‘Some Reflections on the Effect of Artisanal Fishing on Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation’, in M Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement 
of Disputes (Brill 2007) 629-665 and below. 
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non-exclusive fishing rights in the maritime area in issue had been established for a 
long period of time.10 Nonetheless, it was clear that the fishing activities in question 
were being conducted on an industrial scale. The nature of the fishing practices 
involved was not a material factor as far at the ICJ was concerned. It was satisfied that 
the withdrawal of such entitlements would have a substantial and detrimental impact 
on the livelihoods of those fishers who depended on continued access to these fishing 
grounds. It is highly improbable that the British and German fishers had been fishing 
in the waters claimed by Iceland since time immemorial given the distance involved. 
Consequently, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, the notion of traditional fishing 
rights was understood in a purely temporal sense and even then only by recourse to 
a relatively short time-frame and not by reference to the type of fishing methods which 
were being observed.  
In sharp contrast, artisanal fishing practices invariably involve fishing on a small 
commercial scale using rudimentary methods that have been followed in a given 
maritime area often since time immemorial. In many ways, the Eritrea/Yemen Awards 
constituted a pivotal moment for the jurisprudence of artisanal fishing rights.11 The 
Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal was significantly influenced by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation’s 1995 Fisheries Infrastructure Development Project Report, which 
stressed the importance of a number of key requirements for inter-generational fishing 
activities to qualify as ‘artisanal fishing’.12 Further, the Tribunal was anxious to 
distinguish this type of fishing from industrial fishing. It noted that: 
 
[…] “Artisanal fishing” is used in contrast to “industrial fishing”. It does not 
exclude improvements in powering the small boats, in the techniques of 
navigation, communication or in the techniques of fishing; but the traditional 
regime of fishing does not extend to large-scale commercial or industrial fishing 
nor to fishing by nationals of third States in the Red Sea, whether small-scale 
or industrial.13  
 
                                                 
10 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, ibid [61]. 
11 First Award in the Eritrea/Yemen Case (Territorial Sovereignty), PCA, 9 October 1998; and its 
Second Award (Maritime Delimitation), PCA, 17 December 1999. 
12 UN FAO’s Fisheries Infrastructure Development Project Report on Fishing in Eritrean Waters 
(1995), cited in the Second Eritrea/Yemen Award, ibid [105]. 
13 ibid [106]. 
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The character and scope of artisanal fishing rights were closely scrutinized in the 
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration Case and the analysis undertaken in the 
parties’ pleadings has contributed to our understanding of the concept of artisanal 
fishing rights in key respects.14 At a definitional level, Barbados observed in the 
pleadings that: ‘[…] traditional artisanal fishing may be broadly conceived as akin to 
an irrevocable licence available to certain members of a functional, intergenerational 
group, defined cumulatively in terms of nationality, occupation, and prior exploitation 
of the resources of a specific maritime region’.15 This led Barbados to conclude that, 
‘[i]n the lexicon of international law […] artisanal fishing denotes traditional fishing’.16 
In its 2016 South China Sea Award, the Tribunal endorsed the 
artisanal/industrial fishing distinction adopted by the Eritrea/Yemen Awards,17 but it 
went further by observing that:  
  
Artisanal fishing has been a matter of concern in a variety of international fora 
without any common definition having been adopted […] Despite this attention, 
the essential defining element of artisanal fishing remains, as the tribunal in 
Eritrea v. Yemen noted, relative. The specific practice of artisanal fishing will 
vary from region to region, in keeping with local customs. Its distinguishing 
characteristic will always be that, in contrast with industrial fishing, artisanal 
fishing will be simple and carried out on a small scale, using fishing methods 
that largely approximate those that have historically been used in the region.18  
 
The increasing attention paid, by arbitral Tribunals, to the fishing methods used in 
situations where traditional fishing claims are asserted made has had a discernible 
impact on both the nature and scope of this kind of non-exclusive activity. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that, for the most part, traditional 
fishing rights are largely equated with artisanal fishing rights nowadays.  
                                                 
14 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, (n 8). The Tribunal did not engage fully with the substantive 
arguments advanced by the parties on this issue due to its finding that the factual basis underpinning 
Barbados’s claim had not been established. 
15 Barbados’ Reply (n 8) [409]. 
16 ibid. 
17 South China Sea Award (n 2) [795-796]. 
18 ibid [797]. 
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III. The Doctrine of Vested (or Acquired) Rights 
A.  The General Concept and Scope of Vested Rights  
The doctrine of vested, or acquired, rights originated as a response to situations of 
State succession and has achieved the status of a general principle of law.19 The 
principle holds that private rights acquired in, or recognised by, one legal system 
survive the changes that come about with a transfer of sovereignty by ensuring that 
they retain their legal validity in the succeeding legal system. More recently, the 
doctrine has also been considered to be relevant in situations where maritime areas, 
such as the High Seas, are enclosed pursuant to claims made by coastal States.20 In 
particular, the doctrine of vested rights seems to have gained resonance for the 
purpose of establishing traditional fishing rights in relation to processes initiated to 
establish maritime boundaries and the declaration of maritime zones. For instance, 
the South China Sea Tribunal was keen to embrace the vested rights argument 
advanced by the Philippines. Specifically, it understood that: 
 
The legal basis for protecting artisanal fishing stems from the notion of vested 
rights and the understanding that, having pursued a livelihood through artisanal 
fishing over an extended period, generations of fishermen have acquired a 
right, akin to property, in the ability to continue to fish in the manner of their 
forebears. Thus, traditional fishing rights extend to artisanal fishing that is 
carried out largely in keeping with the longstanding practice of the community, 
in other words to “those entitlements that all fishermen have exercised 
continuously through the ages” […] Importantly, artisanal fishing rights attach 
to the individuals and communities that have traditionally fished in an area. 
These are not the historic rights of States, as in the case of historic titles, but 
private rights, as was recognised in Eritrea v. Yemen […]21 
 
                                                 
19 See Reisman and Arsanjani (n 9) 658-659.  
20 The doctrine of vested rights has also been used to account for the recognition of certain rights 
belonging to Indigenous peoples, at least within common law jurisdictions. See PG McHugh, 
Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rights (OUP 2011). But, as discussed 
below, such grand-parented rights are vulnerable to the sovereign authority of the successor State in 
the absence of constitutional protection.  
21 South China Sea Award (n 2) [798] (footnotes omitted and italics added). 
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In support of its analysis, the Tribunal relied on the PCIJ’s treatment of this doctrine in 
the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case.22 Specifically, in its 
judgment, the Court noted that:  
 
Private rights acquired under the existing law do not cease on a change of 
sovereignty […] [E]ven those who contest the existence in international law of 
a general principle of State succession do not go as far as to maintain that 
private rights including those acquired from the State as the owner of the 
property are invalid against a successor in sovereignty.23  
 
This authority has been marshalled in support of the stability and continuity of legal 
orders by many eminent international lawyers.24 However, there are certain difficulties 
with harnessing the idea of vested rights, as it was elaborated in the German Interests 
Case, for the purpose of sustaining artisanal fishing claims. In that case, the Court was 
confronted with a state of affairs where the Poland – the successor State – was 
seeking to invalidate contracts entered into by representatives of the German State 
and individual German settlers, who had subsequently become Polish citizens. 
Accordingly, in the German Interests Case, two comparable municipal legal systems 
were involved, the argument in favour of continuity was seen as overwhelming and the 
means of giving effect to such rights was relatively straightforward.  
In any event, he doctrine’s contours have remained contested at a general 
level.25 It has been claimed the principle mandates that the transfer of sovereignty has 
no bearing on pre-existing private rights, which must be fully respected by a new 
sovereign’s legal system; however, even the doctrine’s leading proponents have 
adopted a more qualified approach. For example, O’Connell admitted that it amounts 
to, ‘no more than a principle that a change in sovereignty should not touch the interests 
                                                 
22 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Judgment of 25 May 1926, PCIJ Series A, 
No.7, 4, 42, cited ibid [808]. 
23 German Interests Case, ibid 36. 
24 See Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies in International Law (1927); and DP 
O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, vol 1 (CUP 1967); and Reisman 
and Arsanjani (n 9) 658-659. 
25 Lauterpacht acknowledged that the principle was problematic in certain respects and was ripe for 
codification. See Eli Lauterpacht (ed) Hersch Lauterpacht: International Law: Collected Papers, vol 1, 
(CUP 1970) 479-480. The ILC considered certain aspects of the doctrine to be ‘extremely 
controversial’, Second Report of the Special Rapporteur on State Succession, ILC Yearbook (1969) 
vol 2, 228-229.  
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of individuals more than is necessary’, and that international minimum standards 
would need to be observed in the event of the alteration or termination of vested rights 
in any given case.26 Accordingly, while a new sovereign may be capable of introducing 
new laws which may affect, or abrogate, pre-existing entitlements belonging to foreign 
nationals such a course of action would not be tenable if it compromised applicable 
human rights law.27  
 
B. Vested Rights and the ‘Mavrommatis Fiction’ 
Another case concerning vested rights, which is especially significant for the present 
purposes, is the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case.28 Mavrommatis, a Greek 
national, was granted certain concessions relating to Palestine by the Ottoman 
Empire. However, after the First World War, Britain (the mandatory authority) granted 
overlapping concessions to someone else. Mavrommatis complained that Britain had 
expropriated his property and, ultimately, Greece initiated proceedings against Britain. 
At one level, the case involved an unremarkable exercise of diplomatic protection, a 
mechanism which allows a State to take up the case of one of its nationals where the 
individual concerned has been injured by the internationally wrongful conduct of 
another State. Nevertheless, at the jurisdiction stage, the PCIJ famously observed that 
through the exercise of diplomatic protection, ‘a State is in reality asserting its own 
rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of 
international law’.29 Therefore, according to the Court, by taking up the claim of one of 
its nationals at the inter-State level, a State is – in effect – transforming that individual’s 
private rights into State rights. This interpretation has become known as the 
Mavrommatis fiction. The ICJ has subsequently observed that this entitlement is not 
counter-balanced by the existence of a concomitant international legal obligation, 
                                                 
26 See O’Connell (n 24) 266; and RY Jennings and A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, 
vol. 1, 9th edn (Longman, 1992) 216. Others have pointed out that a succeeding State possesses the 
same freedom to change the law as its predecessor once exercised: see James Crawford, Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2012, 8th edn) 429. 
27 MN Shaw, International Law (CUP 2017, 8th edn) 758. Eg see Mabo v Queensland [No 1] (1988) 
166 CLR 186. 
28 See Michael Waibel, ‘Mavromatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v Great Britain) (1924-
1927)’, in Eirik Bjorge and Cameron Miles (eds), Landmark Cases in Public International Law (Hart 
2017) 33-59. 
29 Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case (1924) PCIJ Rep Series A No. 2 (Jurisdiction), 12. This 
position was echoed by the ICJ in the Nottebohm Case (Lichtenstein/Guatemala), (1955) ICJ Reps 4, 
24. 
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instead the State in question is the sole judge of whether to grant diplomatic protection 
and an affected national has no recourse as a matter of international law if that State 
chooses not to act.30  
The Mavrommatis fiction has attracted serious criticism over the years but it 
has been defended on the ground that it provides individuals with a vital remedial 
device through which their rights can be vindicated on the international plane.31 But 
Pellet points out that the approach articulated in the Mavrommatis Case fails to accord 
with reality, not least the fact that the trigger for the exercise of diplomatic protection 
is the violation of a given individual’s private rights.32 He attributes the fiction to an 
ideological commitment to the current structure of the international legal order. In 
particular, by maintaining that diplomatic protection involves the exercise of State right, 
individuals (and, by implication, sub-State groups) are denied international legal 
personality by a system that evolved to regulate – exclusively – relations between 
States.33 Consequently, Pellet argues that the existing approach should be 
abandoned in favour of one which recognises that the rights involved belong to the 
individuals concerned and the State is acting in a purely representative capacity when 
it invokes the mechanism of diplomatic protection.34 But, as things stand, although 
certain remedial advantages arise from the continued observance of the Mavrommatis 
fiction, the implications cannot be ignored for individuals. This fiction has special 
resonance in relation to the protection of traditional fishing rights given their grounding 
in the doctrine of vested rights. Clearly, the current approach leaves any rights that 
non-State actors may have at the international level vulnerable to State discretion and, 
for obvious reasons, this is hardly a satisfactory position for marginalized minorities 
and Indigenous peoples to be in. In contrast, the approach championed by Pellet not 
only has the advantage of according with reality, it would also have the effect of 
                                                 
30 See the Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium/Spain) (1970) ICJ Reps 3, 44 and the ILC’s ‘Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries’ (UN, 2006), 28. 
31 See the ILC’s Commentary in Draft Art 1, ibid 27. There has been increasing support for the ‘two 
rights’ thesis with international courts now being more sympathetic to the idea that, in cases of 
diplomatic protection, the State is invoking its own right and those of the affected individuals. See 
Waibel (n 28) 54. However, the ILC’s Draft Art 1 does not explicitly endorse such an approach, 
preferring instead to follow an open-ended approach: see Commentary, 27[5]. 
32 A Pellet, ‘The Second Death of Euripide Mavrommatis? Notes on the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection’ (2008) 7 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 33-58, 37. 
33 ibid 37-38. 
34 ibid 51-52. 
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strengthening the international legal personality of the individuals and societal groups 
involved.   
 
C. Vested Rights and Traditional/Artisanal Fishing 
The question for present purposes is whether and how ideas of vested rights 
developed in the context of State succession are applicable to the case where a given 
maritime area, which previously formed part of the High Seas becomes subject to the 
sovereignty, or jurisdiction, of a given coastal State. In such circumstances, it is clear 
that the doctrine’s general interpretation is open to question on the basis that the 
relationship between the two legal systems involved – international law and the 
domestic legal system of the coastal State in issue – are not, prima facie, comparable 
for the purpose of the operation of the vested rights doctrine. Gerald Fitzmaurice 
addressed the manner in which the doctrine of vested rights operates in relation to 
traditional fishing rights as State entitlements by way of his analysis of the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case.35 His insight on this point is worth quoting at length: 
 
Thus if the fishing vessels of a given country have been accustomed from time 
immemorial, or over a long period, to fish in a certain area, on the basis of the 
area being high seas and common to all, it may be said that their country has 
through them (and although they are private vessels having no specific 
authority) acquired a vested interest that the fisheries of that area should remain 
available to its fishing vessels (of course on a non-exclusive basis) – so that if 
another country asserts a claim to that area as territorial waters, which is found 
to be valid or comes to be recognized, this can only be subject to the acquired 
rights of fishery in question, which must continue to be respected.36  
 
A number of points are worth noting at this stage. First, it is clear that, in this passage, 
Fitzmaurice is concerned with the acquisition of non-exclusive rights – which he 
asserts belong to States – rather than exclusive historic rights.37 Secondly, in 
discussing the significance of the notion of vested rights pursuant to traditional fishing 
                                                 
35 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK/Norway), (1951) ICJ Reps 116. 
36 G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-1954: General 
Principles and Sources of Law’ (1953) 30 BYIL 1, 51. Italics added. 
37 ibid 47-50. Also see Zhou Keyuan, ‘Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice’, 
(2001) 32 Ocean Development & International Law 149. 
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claims in situations where a coastal State asserts that a given maritime area forms 
part of its territorial waters, Fitzmaurice argues that such traditional rights are binding 
on a coastal State because they constitute the stronger rights in question (as they are 
pre-existing entitlements).38  
Thirdly, from Fitzmaurice’s careful formulation, it appears he is saying that 
before a coastal State makes a new claim that a certain marine area comes within its 
territorial waters, another State which subsequently asserts non-exclusive fishing 
rights in those waters (which were previously part of the High Seas) has no rights until 
those waters are claimed and enclosed. It may be supposed that, until that moment, 
the other State possesses nothing more than the freedoms it enjoys in common with 
other States. Such an initial impression might be supported by the view that no 
individual, or State, can have enforceable property or private rights in the High Seas, 
as it constitutes res communis. This view might also make sense when this matter is 
considered by reference to the way in which the doctrine of acquired rights works in 
general as it facilitates the continuity of rights conferred, or recognised, by one legal 
system when it has been superseded by another legal system. The difficulty with the 
general account, when applied in the context of traditional fishing rights, is that it 
purports to turn a freedom into a right which is then opposable against all other States. 
Fitzmaurice does not seem to appreciate the full implications of his analysis in this 
respect; instead he notes that:  
 
In the case of the sea, which is res communis, international law confers a 
positive right on all to exploit its resources – and anyone who does so is 
exercising a substantive right, and not merely availing himself of a faculty to do 
something which international law does not prohibit.39 
 
He goes on: 
 
[…] and if this right is actually exercised for sufficiently long in a particular area, 
this may lead to the formation of a vested interest, conferring special rights in 
                                                 
38 Fitzmaurice (n 36) 51. 
39 ibid 52. 
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relation to that area as such, i.e. to continue the exploitation there, even though 
the area passes under the jurisdiction of a coastal State.40 
 
This observation prompts reflection on the relationship between the private rights in 
question and the claimant State. In this context, as discussed in the next section, it is 
worth noting that, for instance, in the Eritrea/Yemen Case the private rights in question 
were not comprehensible by reference to the national laws of Eritrea or Yemen, 
respectively. Indeed, the non-exclusive entitlements exercisable by the fisher-folk in 
issue had emerged long before the State parties to the dispute came into existence 
and, so they were not underpinned by modern conceptions of State sovereignty or 
indeed the idea that the High Seas constitute res communis.  
In the circumstances, as Fitzmaurice’s reasoning shows, international law – as 
a distinct normative regime – cannot account for the creation of traditional fishing 
rights, at least not on its own. Instead, it must rely on another normative system (e.g. 
a municipal legal order or, as discussed below, a hybrid normative order) by which the 
prior legal validity of private rights can be established pursuant to the operation of the 
doctrine of vested rights.  
 
IV. The Hybrid Nature of Artisanal Fishing Rights  
In its First Award, the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal declared that its finding that Yemen 
possessed sovereignty over certain islands in the Red Sea did not prevent the ancient 
traditional fishing regime, which entitled artisanal fishers from both Eritrea and Yemen 
to access and harvest resources in this marine area, from continuing.41 In its Second 
Award, the Tribunal sought to elaborate on the content and ambit of this regime which, 
it resolved, would straddle any maritime boundaries delimited.42 It justified this regime 
by recourse to wider Islamic concepts which had, in its view, acquired the status of a 
regional tradition.43 Further, the Tribunal fully acknowledged the intermediate 
character of the artisanal fishing rights in issue and, although it ruled that these private 
inter-generational rights could be asserted at the inter-State level, the Tribunal 
understood that their normative origins were not to be found in the municipal legal 
                                                 
40 ibid. 
41 Eritrea/Yemen Case, First Award (n 11) [526]. 
42 Eritrea/Yemen Case, Second Award (n 11) [94]. 
43 ibid [94-95]. 
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orders of the States involved, nor were they derived from international law. In the 
circumstances, it based its Second Award on the recognition of the existence of a 
hybrid normative order – a lex pescatoria – that was sustained by regional traditional 
practices which had been followed on either side of the Red Sea since time 
immemorial.44 This approach chimes with contemporary thinking which champions the 
existence of a plurality of normative orders but it fits rather uncomfortably with the 
LOSC’s avowed statist character.  
In his analysis of the Second Award, Antunes applauds the way in which the 
Tribunal managed to super-impose a traditional fishing regime onto the state-centric 
processes established to determine the allocation of territorial sovereignty and to 
delimit the maritime boundaries between the parties.45 In so doing, he commends the 
Tribunal for looking beyond Western constructions of sovereignty in an effort to find a 
juridical solution that would give effect to historical artisanal fishing practices. But 
despite the Tribunal’s apparent willingness to move beyond the structural confines of 
the international legal order and those of the national legal systems involved, Antunes 
is rightly troubled by the unintended consequences of this otherwise welcome shift. 
First, he is concerned by the Tribunal’s preparedness to ground its findings in the 
Islamic tradition on the basis that such an approach is, inevitably, geographically and 
culturally limiting – how could a pluralistic approach to artisanal rights be justified 
outside of the Islamic World? Second, Antunes worries about the Tribunal’s ruling that 
the traditional fishing regime established in the Red Sea qualifies as an international 
servitude,46 which, logically, imposes an obligation on the burdened State in respect 
of the maritime area concerned – like some kind of internationally-recognised 
prescriptive easement, or usufruct entitlement.47 As Antunes points out, the central 
difficultly with this conception of artisanal fishing rights is that it endeavours to convert 
the private entitlements in question directly into State rights and, in so doing, it fails to 
appreciate the full implications of the fact that artisanal fishers are non-State actors.48  
                                                 
44 Antunes applied the term ‘lex pescatoria’ in this context. See NSM Antunes, ‘The 1999 
Eritrea/Yemen Maritime Delimitation Award and the Development of International Law’ (2001) 50 
ICLQ 299, 306.  
45 ibid.  
46 Eritrea/Yemen Case, First Award (n 11) [126]. 
47 See the Abyei Arbitration Award (Sudan/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement), Arbitration Award, 
22 July 2009 [754].  
48 Antunes (n 44) 310. In this respect, the Tribunal’s conception of traditional fishing rights appears to 
be consistent with the one advanced by Fitzmaurice, as discussed in the previous section.  
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It is worth noting that the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal was not constituted under the 
terms of Annex VII of the LOSC as Eritrea was not a party to the Convention at the 
material time. Consequently, the Tribunal was not bound to observe its applicable law 
provision.49 Instead, the 1996 Arbitration Agreement empowered the Tribunal to take 
the LOSC into account along with any other pertinent factors.50 As a result, it could 
afford to take a more expansive view of traditional fishing rights for the purpose of 
rendering its Awards. Indeed, in its Second Award, the Tribunal was prepared to adopt 
a reflective approach to the question of the rights of non-State actors in the 
international legal order, when it observed that:  
 
As the Tribunal has indicated in its Award on Sovereignty, the traditional fishing 
regime [in the Red Sea] is one of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen 
of both Eritrea and Yemen. It is to be preserved for their benefit. This does not 
mean, however, that Eritrea may not act on behalf of its nationals, whether 
through diplomatic contacts with Yemen or through submissions to this 
Tribunal. There is no reason to import into the Red Sea the western legal fiction 
– which is in any event losing its importance – whereby all legal rights, even 
those in reality held by individuals, were deemed to be those of the State. The 
legal fiction served the purpose of allowing diplomatic representation (where 
the representing State so chose) in a world in which individuals had no 
opportunities to advance their own rights. It was never meant to be the case 
however that, were the right to be held by an individual, that neither the 
individual nor his State should have access to international redress.51  
 
This paragraph acknowledges that States are not the only holders of rights as a matter 
of international law, as individuals may possess such entitlements, too. However, this 
recognition is accompanied by the observation that Eritrea possesses broad rights to 
represent its nationals – via the mechanism of diplomatic protection – regarding the 
assertion and protection of artisanal fishing rights in the Red Sea. However, the Award 
does not address the way in which such entitlements could be asserted by the Eritrean 
                                                 
49 Art 293(1) LOSC provides that: ‘A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply 
this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention’. 
50 Art 2(3) of the 1996 Agreement, annexed to the First Award (n 11). 
51 Eritrea/Yemen Second Award (n 11) [101]. Italics added. 
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fisher-folk themselves in the event of dispute, other than through the Eritrean State. In 
short, at a remedial level, the practical significance of the observation that individuals 
(or sub-State groups) have certain rights is extremely limited.52 Accordingly, while the 
Tribunal showed its awareness of the hybrid character of artisanal fishing rights, the 
Awards could be seen as a missed opportunity to advance significantly the concept of 
artisanal fishing rights as collective rights belonging to non-State groups.  
V. Artisanal Fishing Rights in the Territorial Sea  
Traditional fishing rights have long been acknowledged in relation to a coastal State’s 
internal and territorial waters. And, as the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case showed, 
in appropriate cases, they may constitute a legitimate factor for the purpose of 
establishing the parameters of these maritime areas pursuant to the practice of 
drawing of straight baselines.53 In that case, while the traditional fishing activities in 
issue were being undertaken by Norway’s coastal-based inhabitants rather than by 
the claimant State’s fisher-folk, the ICJ was prepared to take into consideration: ‘the 
vital [economic] needs of the population’ which had been established by ‘very ancient 
and peaceful usage’, 54 especially as the inhabitant of ‘this barren region … derive[d] 
their livelihood essentially from fishing’ in this context.55  
As far as the maritime zone of the territorial sea is concerned, Article 2(3) of the 
LOSC provides that a coastal State’s ‘sovereignty … is exercised subject to the 
Convention and to other rules of international law’. While it appeared that a coastal 
State’s territorial waters amounted to a straightforward seaward extension of its 
sovereign authority – save for the exception of the right of innocent passage – the 
renvoi in the text of this provision evidently created the scope for a coastal State’s 
sovereignty to be perforated by a wide range of international legal rules both inside 
and outside the Convention. The validity of such a holistic interpretation did not fall to 
be determined by courts and tribunals in the years immediately following the LOSC’s 
entry into force. However, more recently, the meaning of Article 2(3) has been revisited 
in the Chagos Marine Protection Area Award and South China Sea Award. These 
cases will now be considered in turn.  
                                                 
52 However, the limits of the Tribunal’s approach in this regard may be explicable by reference to the 
Mavrommatis fiction, see section III(C).  
53 See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (n 35). 
54 ibid 133 and 142. 
55 ibid, 128. 
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A. The Chagos Marine Protection Area Award 
The Chagos Islands were detached from the British colony of Mauritius in November 
1965 to form the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), a step that was intimately 
connected with the achievement of Mauritian independence. Mauritius’ consent to the 
act of excision was negotiated during the Constitutional Conference on Mauritius, 
which was held at Lancaster House in September 1965. During this Conference, a 
series of commitments – the ‘Lancaster House Undertakings’ – were hammered out 
by the UK government and certain high level Mauritian delegates.56 They formed the 
basis on which the Chagos Archipelago was detached from the Mauritian colonial unit 
and included an undertaking to respect Mauritian fishing rights in the Archipelago’s 
waters. In the Chagos Award, the Tribunal understood that determining the nature and 
effect of the 1965 Undertakings was pivotal to the task of settling the dispute.57 The 
Tribunal decided that the Undertakings implicated Article 2(3) of the LOSC but it did 
not find that they had direct application in relation to the BIOT’s Territorial Sea.58 To 
this end, it examined the drafting history of the corresponding provision in the 1958 
Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea,59 which, in the Tribunal’s view, led to the 
conclusion that a coastal State’s sovereignty could only be constrained by general 
norms of international law in this maritime zone.60  Accordingly, the Tribunal decided 
that, as the Undertakings did not form part of the general corpus of international law, 
they could not generate an obligation on the UK which could be read into Article 2(3).61 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal acknowledged that general international law requires that 
States act in good faith in their international relations and, as a result, it held that the 
UK was bound to honour the Undertakings in its dealings with Mauritius in the context 
of the BIOT’s Territorial Sea.62  
In their Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, Judges Kateka and Wolfrum 
reached the opposite conclusion on the issue of whether the 1965 Undertakings 
                                                 
56 Chagos Award (n 2) [77] and Allen (n 3). 
57 Award ibid, [417] [534] [535] and [536]. 
58 ibid [514]. 
59 Art 1(2) of the 1958 Convention which found its origins in the ILC’s Draft Articles. See ILC’s Draft 
Articles on the Law of the Sea and Commentaries, Eight Session (1956) UN Doc A/3159 265. 
60 Chagos Award (n 2) [515-517]. 
61 ibid [517].  
62 ibid [517] and [520].  
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engaged Article 2(3) directly.63 They harnessed the ILC’s Draft Articles concerning the 
Law of the Sea (and its 1956 Commentaries) in support of a more extensive reading 
of those international legal norms which could be read into what became Article 1(2) 
of the 1958 Convention, and, in turn, Article 2(3) of the 1982 Convention. Specifically, 
the minority alluded to the fact that the ILC anticipated that any such rights and 
obligations could arise, ‘by reason of some special relationship, geographical or other, 
between two States, rights in the territorial sea of one of them are granted to the other 
in excess of the rights recognised in the present draft’.64 Consequently, the minority 
concluded that the reference to ‘other rules of international law’ in Article 2(3) 
encompassed international legal obligations that could be created by means of 
bilateral, or unilateral, commitments: as a result, the minority was of the view that the 
Undertakings must ‘be read directly into Article 2(3) of the Convention’.65 In sum, both 
the approach adopted in the Chagos Award and the minority’s view allow for the 
possibility that, in principle, a traditional fishing regime could exist within the Territorial 
Sea.  
As noted above, in the Chagos Award, both the majority and minority took the 
view that Mauritius’ fishing rights in the BIOT’s Territorial Sea were recognised in the 
1965 Undertakings, which created international legal obligations for the UK.66 As a 
consequence, the Tribunal ruled that there was no need to examine whether a 
traditional fishing regime existed in this maritime zone via the traditional activities of 
Mauritian (i.e. Chagossian) fishers in these territorial waters.67 In its pleadings, 
Mauritius went to great lengths to show the degree to which the UK government, and 
its colonial administrations in Mauritius and the Seychelles, acknowledged that the 
artisanal fishing activities which were carried out in the BIOT’s Territorial Sea would 
continue to be respected after the Chagos Islands were detached from the Mauritian 
colonial unit.68 However, in this respect, Mauritius failed to highlight the extent to which 
the traditional fishing undertaken in this maritime zone was largely conducted by the 
Chagos Islanders themselves, rather than by fishers from the island of Mauritius, 
                                                 
63 Dissenting and Concurring Opinion appended to the Chagos Award (n 2) [94]. 
64 ILC’s 1956 Report, 265 [5] ibid [93-94]. 
65 Dissenting and Concurring Opinion (n 63). 
66 Mauritius claimed that traditional fishing rights and the Lancaster House Undertaking regarding 
Mauritius’ fishing rights were both compatible with the LOSC. Mauritius’ Memorial (n 2) 125-133. 
67 Chagos Award (n 2) [456]. 
68 See Mauritius’ Memorial (n 2) 125-129 and Reply, 56-58 and 170-173. 
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which located over 1,000 miles away from the Archipelago.69 Thus, while the fishing 
rights expressed in the 1965 Undertakings were negotiated by Mauritian ministers, 
they were largely informed by the exercise of traditional fishing activities undertaken  
in and around the Archipelago by the Chagossians themselves.70 In any event, as the 
Chagos Archipelago formed part of the Mauritian colonial unit before it was excised to 
create the BIOT, even if non-exclusive fishing rights had not been protected via the 
Lancaster House Undertakings, the Mauritian State could have used the mechanism 
of diplomatic protection in order to protect the traditional fishing activities of the Chagos 
Islanders on the basis that they were Mauritian nationals. Consequently, by only 
addressing the non-exclusive fishing rights enumerated in the Lancaster House 
Undertakings in its Award the Tribunal overlooked the customary international law 
relating to artisanal fishing rights and its significance for non-State actors.71  
 
B. The South China Sea Arbitration Award  
The South China Sea dispute arose from the PRC’s claim to exercise sovereignty over 
much of the South China Sea as a result of its possession of exclusive historic rights 
in this area. The South China Sea Tribunal decided that China’s exclusive historic 
rights argument could not satisfy the requirements for a valid historic title claim relating 
to the South China Sea under the terms of the Convention.72 The Tribunal turned to 
consider whether the PRC and/or the Philippines could have acquired non-exclusive 
artisanal fishing rights in the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal. Scarborough 
Shoal was a maritime feature over which both the Philippines and the PRC claimed 
sovereignty.73 The South China Sea Tribunal indicated, the existence of traditional 
fishing rights in the Territorial Sea is particularly important for artisanal fishers 
                                                 
69 See Allen (n 3). 
70 See the DC’s judgment in Bancoult No. 3 (n 3); Dunne’s witness statement, Mauritius’ Reply, Annex 
172; and R Dunne, N Polunin and P Sand, ‘The Creation of the Chagos Marine Protected Area: A 
Fisheries Perspective’ (2014) 29 Advances in Marine Biology 79. 
71 It could be argued that, in accordance with the ‘Mavrommatis fiction’, the exercise of diplomatic 
protection has the effect of transforming private rights into State rights unless a more enlightened 
view of the normative basis for the operation of diplomatic protection is adopted. See section III(C). 
72 South China Sea Award (n 2) [228-229]. See Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, ‘The Nine-Dash Line 
in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications’ (2013) 107 AJIL 98; and Stephan Talmon, 
‘The South China Sea Arbitration: Is There a Case to Answer?’ in Talmon and Jia (eds), The South 
China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective (Hart 2014) 15-78, 48-54. 
73 Award, ibid [761]. 
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because, ‘the vast majority of traditional fishing takes place in close proximity to the 
coast’.74  
The Philippines claimed, inter alia, that China had prevented Filipino fishers 
from exercising their artisanal fishing rights in the Territorial Sea surrounding 
Scarborough Shoal in violation of the LOSC’s provisions.75 The Tribunal chose to 
apply the interpretation favoured in the Chagos Award i.e. that, in principle, a coastal 
State’s rights in the Territorial Sea are subject to the general rules of international law, 
in accordance with the terms of Article 2(3). To this end, it held that the vested rights 
of the artisanal fishers from both the Philippines and China could generate traditional 
entitlements in the Territorial Sea surrounding Scarborough Shoal as a matter of 
customary international law.76 Specifically, the Tribunal said: 
  
Traditional fishing rights constitute a vested right, and the Tribunal considers 
the rules of international law on the treatment of the vested rights of foreign 
nationals to fall squarely within the “other rules of international law” applicable 
in the territorial sea [pursuant to Article 2(3)].77 
 
The Tribunal’s full endorsement of artisanal fishing rights as vested rights, its 
readiness to view them as compatible with the Convention’s provisions concerning the 
Territorial Sea and its concrete findings concerning the rights of Filipino and Chinese 
fisher-folk in this maritime zone constitute an important moment in the Convention’s 
interpretative development and, specifically, the renvoi contained in Article 2(3).  
VI. Artisanal Fishing Rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
In its Second Award, the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal decided that the traditional fishing 
regime in the Red Sea was, in principle, applicable throughout the parties’ respective 
maritime zones.78 However, such a finding conflicts with the Convention’s provisions, 
which provide that coastal States possess exclusive sovereign rights over living 
                                                 
74 ibid [804]. 
75 The Tribunal classified this maritime feature as a rock for the purpose of determining a coastal 
State’s entitlements under the LOSC. Consequently, Scarborough Shoal was only deemed to have a 
Territorial Sea.  
76 South China Sea Award (n 2) [805-808]. This meant that such rights would be capable of binding 
the coastal State in issue, regardless of whether, ultimately, that was the Philippines or China. 
77 ibid [808] (footnote omitted).  
78 Second Eritrea/Yemen Award (n11) [109]. 
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resources (including fisheries) in the EEZ.79 It has been suggested that the wider 
significance of this Tribunal’s observation regarding the geographical ambit of the 
fishing regime existing in the Red Sea may be overstated. In particular, in its Merits 
Award, the South China Sea Tribunal pointed out that the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal was 
not constituted under the terms of Annex VII of the LOSC and so it was not bound to 
observe the Convention’s applicable law provision.80 This led the South China Sea 
Tribunal to observe that the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal, ‘was thus empowered to – and in 
[its] view did – go beyond the law on traditional fishing as it would exist under the 
Convention’.81 But can the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal’s position on this issue be attributed 
to the breadth of the applicable law or to its reading of the normative reach of artisanal 
fishing rights? This question can only be answered by assessing the way in which the 
relationship between artisanal fishing rights and the Convention’s provisions on the 
EEZ have been interpreted in the subsequent case law. 
In the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration Case, Barbados claimed that 
although Part V of the LOSC regulates the operation of EEZs it does not seek to 
abolish pre-existing artisanal fishing rights.82 Specifically, Barbados argued that the 
Convention could not have extinguished such rights because none of its provisions  
abrogate them expressly. In support of this contention, Barbados alluded to the 
observation, made by an ICJ Chamber in its ELSI decision – that as a matter of 
interpretation, an intention to extinguish existing rights cannot be inferred from a treaty 
provision.83 However, it should be recalled that Barbados was seeking to use artisanal 
fishing rights, which it claimed had been acquired by its nationals, to justify the 
redrawing of the maritime boundary between the parties in its favour (i.e. in support of 
a claim for exclusive rights). In response, Trinidad and Tobago argued that such a 
claim was not made out on the facts and the only way to give effect to non-exclusive 
artisanal fishing rights was via an access regime.84 To this end, it argued that Article 
62(3) of the LOSC provides that, in giving access to other States for the purpose of 
harvesting living resources in its EEZ, a coastal State should take into account ‘the 
                                                 
79 See Art 56 LOSC. 
80 South China Sea Award (n 2) [259].  
81 ibid and see section 4 below. 
82 Barbados Memorial (n 8) [131]. 
83 ELSI Case (US/Italy), (1989) ICJ Reps 15 [50], and Barbados Memorial, ibid, [132]. 
84 The Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of an access regime but it did record 
the undertakings made by Trinidad and Tobago in this regard: Award (n 8) [286-293].  
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need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually 
fished in the zone’.85 Barbados replied that, Article 62(3) sets out a number of factors 
a coastal State should take into account when exercising its discretion to allocate any 
surpluses that may exist and the requirement to have ‘due regard’ to a wide range of 
considerations provides a means of structuring a coastal State’s discretion to allocate 
a surpluses rather than providing a way of grounding an obligation to give effect to 
pre-existing artisanal fishing rights which must now be exercised within a newly-
formed EEZ.86  
Barbados’s reading of this provision is undoubtedly correct. Article 62(3) does 
not endeavour to protect artisanal fishing rights as Part V of the LOSC is silent on the 
question of the ongoing validity of traditional fishing rights in this maritime zone. 
Barbados was anxious to point out that Part IV of the LOSC expressly protects 
traditional fishing rights in the waters of archipelagic States.87 Therefore, it argued that 
the Convention’s drafters must have intended artisanal fishing rights to persist in other 
LOSC zones, too.88 However, this strategy is potentially double-sided as it could also 
be contended that the Convention’s silence as to the continuity of artisanal fishing 
rights in the EEZ in contrast to its effort to regulate this type of fishing archipelagic 
waters might suggest that the drafters did not intend such entitlements to survive the 
creation of EEZs. 
In its Chagos Award, the Annex VII Tribunal decided that it only had jurisdiction 
to adjudicate Mauritius’ fishing rights in relation to the BIOT/Chagos Archipelago’s 
Territorial Sea.89 It took this stance because, in its view, Article 297(3)(a) provides that 
a coastal State is not obligated to submit to section 2 procedures, under Part XV, in 
cases where a dispute relates to the exercise of its sovereign rights in respect of those 
living resources found in its EEZ.90 This did not prevent the Tribunal from finding a 
way forward as far as Mauritius’ rights in the BIOT’s EEZ were concerned. It held that 
the rights and obligations of a coastal State in the EEZ are expressly qualified by the 
requirement to ‘have due regard to the rights and duties of other States’ and, as a 
                                                 
85 Trinidad and Tobago’s Counter-Memorial ibid [213]. 
86 Barbados Reply ibid [398-404]. 
87 See Arts 47 and 51 LOSC. 
88 Barbados Reply (n 8) [403]. 
89 Chagos Award (n 2) [455]. 
90 Stephen Allen ‘Article 297 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Scope 
of Mandatory Jurisdiction’, (2017) 48 Ocean Development and International Law 313. 
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result, this duty had the effect of engaging the Lancaster House Undertakings on the 
facts.91 Nonetheless, the Tribunal was reluctant to establish a universal standard of 
conduct for coastal States in this context but it indicated that what would qualify as a 
duty to have due regard would depend on the circumstances. But it expressed the 
view that, ‘in the majority of cases [the obligation] will necessarily involve at least some 
consultation with the rights-holding State’.92 It is possible to argue that the Tribunal’s 
approach on this issue may have created a degree of symmetry, as far as traditional 
fishing rights are concerned, between the Territorial Sea and the EEZ.93 However, as 
things stand, any protection afforded to such rights relating to the EEZ would inevitably 
be contingent in nature.  
The issue of whether artisanal fishing rights could survive the introduction of an 
EEZ pursuant to the application of the LOSC was directly confronted in the South 
China Sea Award where the Tribunal revisited the importance of the way in which Part 
V’s provisions were drafted when compared with the way in which traditional fishing 
rights were protected in relation to archipelagic waters, in Part IV. Specifically, it 
addressed the importance of Article 62(3) in this regard, observing that: ‘the inclusion 
of this provision – which would be entirely unnecessary if traditional fishing rights were 
preserved in the exclusive economic zone – confirms that the drafters of the 
Convention did not intend to preserved such rights’.94 The Tribunal’s approach 
strengthens the conclusion that the LOSC has the effect of extinguishing artisanal 
fishing rights in the EEZ. It acknowledged that it was open to neighbouring States to 
negotiate fishing rights regimes on a bilateral basis, or coastal States could choose to 
protect such entitlements unilaterally.95 Accordingly, the implication is obvious – 
artisanal fishing rights are not safeguarded by the LOSC alone, or in combination with 
the vested rights doctrine, at least in relation to the EEZ additional protection is 
required.  
Together the Chagos and the South China Sea Awards represent a decisive 
moment in the Convention’s development as far as the recognition of artisanal fishing 
                                                 
91 Chagos Award (n 2) [519]. Art 56(2) provides: ‘In exercising its rights and performing its duties 
under this Convention in the [EEZ], the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of 
other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention’. 
92 ibid.  
93 See N Bankes and E Enyew, ‘Interaction between The Law of the Sea and the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ forthcoming (on file with the author)  
94 South China Sea Award (n 2) [804(b)]. 
95 ibid. Such negotiations would be required in situations where ‘due regard’ obligations are engaged.  
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rights in the Territorial Sea and EEZ are concerned. In respect of the BIOT’s Territorial 
Sea, the Chagos Tribunal was not prepared to read the Lancaster House Undertakings 
directly into Article 2(3) because they did not constitute general norms of international 
law, in its view. Nonetheless, it harnessed the obligation to act in good faith as an 
interpretative device by which the Undertakings could be given indirect effect. There 
was no need for the South China Sea Tribunal to disturb this finding given its ruling 
that the established artisanal fishing rights in Scarborough Shoal’s Territorial Sea were 
general international norms. However, it is apparent from both Awards that bilateral 
arrangements are significant with regard to the ongoing validity of artisanal fishing 
rights in the EEZ. In particular, the Chagos Tribunal relied on the 1965 Undertakings 
in support of the existence of ‘due regard’ obligations while the absence of any 
comparable inter-State arrangements negotiated between the parties in the South 
China Sea case led that Tribunal to conclude that, in principle, pre-existing artisanal 
fishing entitlements could not survive in this maritime zone without the coastal State’s 
consent. Accordingly, when taken together these two Awards complement one 
another and contribute to our understanding of artisanal fishing rights in the Territorial 
Sea and the EEZ.   
VII. The LOSC and the Limits of Subject-matter Jurisdiction 
Another difficulty that may arise, particularly in the context of proceedings initiated 
under Part XV of LOSC, is subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the application of 
Article 293.96 Article 293 enables a court or tribunal, constituted under Article 287, to 
interpret and apply the Convention and any other sources not incompatible with it in 
accordance with the jurisdictional clause set out in Article 288.97 There has been some 
debate about the interrelationship between the notion of applicable law and the matter 
of a court or tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to the operation of Part XV. In this respect, 
it is worth noting the Annex VII Tribunal’s observation, in the Guyana/Suriname Award, 
that Article 293 gives a court or tribunal the competence to apply not only the 
Convention but also relevant norms of customary international law.98  
                                                 
96 See (n 49). 
97 Art 288(1) LOSC holds that: ‘A court or tribunal […] shall have jurisdiction over any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance 
with this Part’. 
98 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guyana and Suriname Award, 17 September 2007, 
30 RIAA 1 [404-406]. The Tribunal thought that its position was consistent with the approach adopted 
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In a recent article, Parlett assessed whether Article 293 has the capacity to 
expand the scope of compulsory jurisdiction pursuant to Part XV.99 While she 
acknowledged the extensive interpretations favoured in the above-mentioned cases, 
she drew attention to the guarded approaches followed, by Annex VII Tribunals, in 
more recent decisions including the Arctic Sunrise Award,100 and the South China Sea 
Award.101 In the former Award, the Tribunal cautioned that Article 293 was designed 
to enable a Part XV court or tribunal to give full effect to the Convention’s provisions 
rather than as a means of expanding its jurisdiction. Accordingly, in its view, Article 
293 facilitates the proper exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 288.102 In 
particular, the Tribunal observed that this provision does not permit external sources, 
especially treaties, to be read into the Convention’s provisions and directly applied, 
unless they have been specifically incorporated by reference.103 In this context, it 
noted that: 
 
The Tribunal considers that, if necessary, it may have regard to general 
international law in relation to human rights in order to determine whether law 
enforcement action such as the boarding, seizure, and detention of the Arctic 
Sunrise and the arrest and detention of those on board was reasonable and 
proportionate. This would be to interpret the relevant Convention provisions by 
reference to relevant context. This is not, however, the same as, nor does it 
require, a determination of whether there has been a breach of Articles 9 and 
12(2) of the ICCPR as such. That treaty has its own enforcement regime and it 
is not for this Tribunal to act as a substitute for that regime.104  
 
                                                 
in M/V Saiga No 2 (Saint Vincent and Grenadines/Guinea), (1999) where ITLOS had recourse to Art 
293 for the purpose of applying the canon of international law concerning the use of force 
notwithstanding the absence of any express reference to this body of law within the Convention itself. 
See ITLOS Reports 1999 7 [155, 159 and 183(9)]. Subsequently, in the Chagos MPa proceedings, 
Mauritius advanced a broad compatibility argument by reference to Art 293. See Mauritius Memorial 
(n 2) [6.4]. 
99 Kate Parlett, ‘Beyond the Four Corners of the Convention: Expanding the Scope of Jurisdiction of 
Law of the Sea Tribunals’ (2017) 48 Ocean Development and International Law 284. 
100 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration Award (Netherlands/Russia), Annex VII LOS Tribunal, Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (14 August 2015). 
101 In the Chagos Award (n 2) the Tribunal did not think it necessary to rule on the relevance of Art 
293 for its purposes. 
102 Arctic Sunrise Award (n 100) [188]. 
103 ibid [192]. 
104 ibid [197] italics added. 
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But, as far as customary international law was concerned, the Tribunal added: 
  
In determining the claims by the Netherlands in relation to the interpretation and 
application of the Convention, the Tribunal may, therefore, pursuant to Article 
293, have regard to the extent necessary to rules of customary international 
law, including international human rights standards, not incompatible with the 
Convention, in order to assist in the interpretation and application of the 
Convention’s provisions […]105 
  
The problem with trying to use Article 293 in order to activate those artisanal fishing 
rights recognisable by customary international law within a coastal State’s EEZ is that 
such an approach would directly contradict the scope of the sovereign rights belonging 
to that State, as set out in Article 56, and the limits upon compulsory jurisdiction, as 
enumerated in Article 297. On this point, the South China Sea Tribunal confirmed that 
customary norms will only be deemed to be compatible with the Convention where 
they do not conflict with its provisions.106 Accordingly, as far as the operation of Part 
XV of the LOSC is concerned, artisanal fishing rights do not survive in the EEZ, in the 
absence of bilateral arrangements (which may be driven by ‘due regard’ obligations), 
without the consent of the coastal State.  
VIII. Artisanal Fishing Communities and Human Rights Treaties  
As discussed above, it is open to a State to take up the claim of one or more of its 
nationals, via the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection, in keeping with the 
Mavrommatis fiction.107 Thus, in the present context, a claimant State seeks to 
harness the LOSC’s dispute settlement provisions in order to protect its artisanal 
fisher-folk where they possess private rights to access and harvesting resources in the 
defendant (coastal) State’s territorial waters. However, it cannot invoke the provisions 
of applicable human rights treaties directly through this process for jurisdictional 
reasons. Against this background, it is worth considering other ways in which artisanal 
fishing communities may be able to trigger the adjudication of their entitlements to 
                                                 
105 ibid [198]. 
106 South China Sea Award (n 2) [238]. Thus, the Tribunal decided the claim that China possesses 
exclusive historic rights to living and non-living resources in the EEZ was incompatible with the 
Convention as it had superseded any prior maritime regime that may have existed in the region, [239]. 
107 See s 3.3. 
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access and harvest resources in a disputed maritime area. To this end, it is clear that 
they are capable of harnessing human rights treaties directly for this purpose. For 
instance, in the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Case, Barbados argued that 
artisanal fishing rights belong not only to States, they vest in individuals and 
communities, too.108 Specifically, it relied on certain multilateral human rights treaties 
– including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),109 the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),110 and the American Convention on 
Human Rights,111 in support of its contention that fishing rights constitute actionable 
individual and/or communal property rights.112 It is clear that Indigenous peoples and 
national minorities can rely on the ICCPR’s provisions and the Human Rights 
Commission’s (HRC) concomitant jurisprudence as well as terms of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s (CERD) jurisprudence in this 
regard.113 Consequently, it would appear that a compelling way forward would be for 
artisanal fishing communities to invoke applicable human rights treaties directly 
against the coastal State involved because it exercises jurisdiction in the area in 
question – not only within its Territorial Sea but within its EEZ as well – rather than 
relying on their own State to take up their claim via the LOSC’s dispute resolution 
mechanisms.114 Such an approach is reminiscent of the way in which minorities and 
                                                 
108 Barbados’ Memorial (n 8) [126]; the Second Eritrea/Yemen Award (n 11); and the South China Sea 
Award (n 2) [798] 
109 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concluded on 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171. 
110 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concluded 
on 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 2. 
111 American Convention on Human Rights, concluded on 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 
July 1978, 1144 UNTS 143. 
112 Barbados sought to rely on the property rights protections contained in international and regional 
human rights treaties including Art 17 ICCPR; Art 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 
and Art 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. It also referred to Baner v Sweden (1989) App. No. 11763/85, 
where the European Commission on Human Rights held that fishing rights qualify as property rights. 
Barbados’ Memorial, ibid. 
113 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, concluded on 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969, 660 UNTS 195. See eg Ben Saul, Indigenous 
Peoples and Human Rights (Hart 2016); and Patrick Thornberry, Oxford Commentary on the 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (OUP 2017). 
114 Art 2(1) ICCPR provides that: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant […]’. See the HRC’s, General Comment No. 31 ‘The Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (29 March 2004). Art 1 ECHR provides 
that the: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’. ICERD does not contain a jurisdictional clause.  
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Indigenous peoples have utilized the quasi-judicial functions of the HRC and CERD in 
a number of pivotal cases, a strategy which has led to the development significant 
bodies of law as far as their rights, and the corresponding obligations of their States, 
are concerned.115 However, it is important to appreciate that the crucial difference here 
is that the tactic being mooted would necessitate the assertion of such rights against 
another coastal State rather than against the individual or community’s State of 
nationality.  
IX. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the juridical foundations of artisanal fishing rights and the 
manner in which these customary entitlements are grounded in the doctrine of vested 
rights – a characteristic which they share with the rights of Indigenous peoples, at least 
within common law settings. It also analysed the way in which the hybrid nature of 
artisanal fishing rights has made their recognition problematic, especially within the 
context of the LOSC’s provisions, but also as a consequence of international law’s 
continuing adherence to the ‘Mavrommatis fiction’ in relation to the exercise of 
diplomatic protection. The chapter examined a number of arbitral decisions, delivered 
over the last two decades, which have upheld the continuity of artisanal fishing rights 
in specific settings. These decisions have shown that such entitlements have been 
deemed to be compatible with the LOSC’s provisions (especially those governing a 
coastal State’s territorial waters) but artisanal rights in the EEZ have been largely 
compromised by the Convention’s provisions concerning this maritime zone. 
Notwithstanding the LOSC’s somewhat uneven framework as far as these non-
exclusive rights are concerned, artisanal fishing communities do possess other means 
of asserting their rights across a range of maritime zones because artisanal fishing 
entitlements are not, essentially, rights that belong to States. In this respect, applicable 
international and regional human rights treaties – and their supervisory and/or 
enforcement mechanisms – have an important role to play in the protection of such 
communal rights. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that such rights may not 
be actionable only against an artisanal fishing community’s own State, as long as it 
can be shown the defendant State exercises jurisdiction over the marine area in 
question. The categories of artisanal fishing communities and Indigenous peoples are 
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not mutually exclusive and it is clear that gains made in the context of artisanal fishing 
rights will, in principle, be applicable to the growing jurisprudence concerning the 
marine resources of Indigenous peoples. Further research needs to be undertaken 
regarding the ways in which Indigenous peoples can make the most of these 
developments and, in turn, contribute to them.  
